Saturday, October 31, 2015

The Varanasi riots


 
(Very exceptionally, I am deferring to the wish of two eyewitnesses, who do not want their names publicized, to publish their account of recent religious violence in Varanasi, also known as Benares.)
 
 
THE INCIDENTS IN VARANASI  IN SEPT.-OCT. 2015

The personal view of two close witnesses

 

My wife and me were close witnesses to the happenings in Varanasi from 22 September to 23 October. We present here an account of how we experienced these happenings.

On 20th September we went to Srividya Math to meet Swami Avimukteshwaranand Saraswati. Around 20-30 people from the Durgapuja Samitis had gone also to meet him. They were telling swamiji that the Allahabad High Court had issued an order prohibiting the visarjan of the murtis in the river Ganga. Last year it was authorised as an exception, but this year the order would be enforced.

During the conversation that followed, it was mentioned that the High Court had previously issued orders to stop the sewers from throwing dirty water into the river, about which nothing had been done. The Assi Nala is continuously throwing thousands of litres of extremely dirty water and nothing has been done to date to prevent it. According to some estimates, dirty water from cities amounts for 60% of the Ganga pollution, factories for 35% and 5% comes from religious actions. It was said that the solution laid in constructing eco-friendly murtis which would not use dangerous chemicals. The Puja Samitis said that they were ready to pay more for this kind of murtis.

The people of the Samitis requested swamiji to help them in this endeavour. Swamiji said that he was ready to fight for dharmic causes, but that usually “I go ahead, and when I look back nobody is following me”. There ended the meeting.

Next day, a procession that was proceeding to Ganga for visarjan of a murti of Ganesh was stopped near Godowlia by the police, who asked that the visarjan should be done in a kund. People did not understand why the police had not stopped the procession in the pandal, and had allowed it to proceed to Godowlia. People were keen in having visarjan in Ganga, but the police let them stay there along the Ganesh murti for many hours (36 hours in total).

After 24 hours had passed, Swami Avimukteshwaranand Saraswati thought that it was not proper to stop the murti of Ganeshji, on which pranapratishtha had been done, in the middle of the road for hours. He went to Godowlia and sat there in dharna along with many other people.

Next day we were shocked on reading in the newspaper headlines that the police had brutally lathi-charged swamiji and the other people there. Several people, including swamiji, had to be admitted in the hospital. At 91 or 2 am in the night, the police, after a brief order to leave the place, closed all the possible exits (why?) and started beating everyone, including swamiji and several Vedic students of tender age. The brutality of the charge can be seen in this video:


The   of this brutal action by the police provoked a deep indignation among the people of Banaras. The video of the lathi-charge was also instrumental, and clearly countered the police efforts to say that nothing had happened. The Ganesh murti was taken by the police and thrown in a haphazard way in Lakshmi Kund.

All kinds of people, including several groups of Muslims and representatives of all political parties, came to meet swamiji and the other injured at the hospital. When he came out of hospital two days later, swamiji went to Kedar Ghat and did a puja of a Ganesh murti fashioned with Ganga clay; a symbolic proper visarjan in Ganga was then done. Around twenty or thirty policemen were present; it looked as if a big criminal was there. Only then swamiji accepted water and food, for he had not taken any during these days.

After this, daily meetings were held at Srividya Math to consider possible actions. Many people attended and presented their views. The indignation at the police action was prevalent. The Administration did not show any regret about the police lathi-charge, nor any action was taken against the responsible authorities. Only later, on the force of the video recordings and the media attention, an impartial enquiry of the happenings was reluctantly agreed upon.

In one of the meetings a representation of Kashi pandits came, and explained that, according to the shastras, visarjan should be done in running water. Although the tradition of murti visarjan as done nowadays with large images shown in pandals is only one or two centuries old, still the tradition of making murtis from Ganga or other rivers and releasing them in the same place is there since time immemorial, and rules for this are given in the shastras.

Also came to different meetings politicians, boatmen, murtikars, etc. The murtikars, the people who construct the statues, said they were ready to construct eco-friendly murtis, even if that would be harmful to their business.

Of common accord it was decided to call a procession “Anyay pratikar yatra” on 5 October. People were to meet at Town Hall and proceed peacefully towards Godowlia and to the river Ganga. A number of sadhus were there, along with representatives of most political parties except Samajwadi Party (in power in Uttar Pradesh; however, some members of this party attended personally) and many common citizens. Also attended a few dozens of Muslims. It is to be mentioned that, during the discourses in Town Hall, Swami Avimukteshwaranand took away the microphone from the hands of Sadhvi Prachi when she started to communally polarize the event by making remarks about the Muslim community. Swamiji ordered that the procession should proceed in peace, that no political party’s banners should be shown (although later a few were), that no “murdabad-zindabad” slogans should be raised, etc. Everything should proceed in a peaceful atmosphere.

The procession started peacefully from Town Hall, Maidagin, towards Chowk and Godowlia. Probably from 50,000 to one lakh people of all religious and political tendencies participated in the march. From the houses and terraces along the way many people were looking, encouraging and supporting the march, throwing flowers and giving drinking water to the participants, etc. The procession was headed by a representation of Kashi Viswanath; behind were several swamis, then women, then the rest of the people. I was at 30-50 m behind the head of the procession. In Bansphatak, before getting to Godowlia, we saw a column of black smoke rising ahead. Shortly after, people started to run in stampede. I tried to protect a startled old dandi swami from being trampled upon, then fell down. Tear gas spread and made us all cry. There was a lot of confusion. Nobody was knowing what was going on.

We later came to know that, before the procession reached Godowlia, a group of people concentrated from the other side of Godowlia and started to burn motorcycles and throw stones at the police. There was extreme violence and several people, including policemen, were hurt.

However, as shown clearly in some photos, a part of the police seems to have collaborated to some extent in spreading the troubles. The photographer who took photos of several policemen burning a motorcycle was strongly beaten and had to go to hospital. Who were responsible for the violence is not yet clear. But whoever the culprit, they succeeded in converting a peaceful movement into a violent one. After that, no one gave attention to the fact that many tens of thousands of people had united in a peaceful demonstration, an event unique in the story of Varanasi.

After this, the Administration reacted strongfully. Many people were arrested and put into jail. A long list of cases: sedition, loot, dacoity, attempt to murder, etc., were charged on Swami Avimukteshwaranand Saraswati, other swamis and Ajay Ray, leader of the Congress. Ajay Ray was arrested and sent to jail, although several political leaders did exactly the same as he did. Afterwards, without trying to bring out any meaningful negotiation or compromise, the Administration threatened the Puja Samitis with dire consequences (jail, etc.) if they did not do the visarjan in the places marked: two ponds constructed in a hurry at far away places. The atmosphere was of police dictatorship. The Administration succeeded in forcing people to do visarjan as they wanted, but then nobody was satisfied and a sense of bitterness had spread in Varanasi.

Our personal opinion is that all the problems can be traced back to the Administration’s incompetent behaviour. First, stopping the procession with the Ganesh murti in the middle of the road without clear options or way out. Next, the brutal lathi-charge on cornered peaceful people, which remembered one about the times of the British Raj and Mahatma Gandhi. Later, the absolute obstinacy and the refusal to negotiate or bring out a compromise. A small problem which could have been easily solved to the satisfaction of all was, by treating it as merely a law-and-order problem, converted in a big and dangerous issue.

Moreover, instead of concentrating on the main sources of pollution of Ganga and the lack of water current that makes this pollution much more dangerous, the Administration has concentrated on a very minor source of pollution and chosen a soft target where results can be shown without hard work, just by applying force. Even this minor source of pollution should be avoided, on this everyone agrees. Apart from its religious significance, the murti visarjan is an important part of the festivals. To do the visarjan in a far away kund built for the occasion, without any religious significance and where the symbolism is killed, is no good solution. If the murtis contain dangerous chemicals, these are also venomous in the kunds (in the new constructed kunds the water will return to the Ganga or filter down to the aquifers).

The solution clearly lies in encouraging the construction of eco-friendly murtis, which can be then submerged in the Ganga, clay mixing with clay and divinity returning to divinity. It should not be difficult to arrive at an understanding on these lines, where everybody would feel satisfied.

 

Read more!

Wednesday, October 21, 2015

Interview about Romila Thapar


 

The dean of established Indian history, Romila Thapar, was interviewed in the Communist fortnightly Frontline (18 Sep 2015). Sandeep Balakrishna from India Facts (5 Oct 2015) sollicited a response from me.
 
 
 

1.       Sandeep Balakrishna (SB): Prof Thapar mentions that the kind of academic scholarship and history writing currently done is “impressive” and that “at least among those historians who work at the better universities and colleges.” Equally, she reminisces about how “history was taught fifty years ago, and the kinds of struggles that we had in those days to give a new direction to historical writing, and the kind of direction that is now being taken, it is in fact an impressive change. I am pleased with the way things have gone, although admittedly the change is not universal in the universities and most have still not caught up with history as it is taught in the best centres.” In this light, several questions arise, Dr. Elst: (a) Can you list some of these current history books that Prof Thapar finds impressive. (b) Which are these “better” universities and “best” centres where this sort of impressive history writing takes place? (c) How would you compare the history taught 50 years ago to the history that emerged after Prof Thapar gave it said direction?

 

Koenraad Elst (KE): Given that this is a digital medium not constricted by space limitations, I may be forgiven for answering rather amply. There is already so much hurried superficiality these days.

Fifty years ago, RC Majumdar was at the end of his career. As he was a very prominent historian, whose History of India and History of the Freedom Struggle was required reading throughout the History departments across India, he was the main figure to be shot down. He was typical of the intellectuals at the heart of the Congress movement: secular-minded in a Gandhian way, but far more steeped in Hindu tradition than we can now imagine, and naturally accepting the religious and “communal” factors in history. Other such historians were Jadunath Sarkar and, effectively, the anthropologist GS Ghurye. They naturally accepted and documented Islam as a factor in Hindu-Muslim conflict and in the well-documented fact of Islamic iconoclasm, c.q. the subversive role of the Christian missions.

I don’t know what universities she has in mind, but I imagine it would be the pioneers of her own version of history, JNU and AMU. Further, most serious universities have followed suit or are using her school’s textbooks. There are very few hold-outs of Hindu-minded history, and these are admittedly not very creative, nor have they got international standing. The Marxists have always had their eye on the cultural sector, but after Indira Gandhi needed their support in a power struggle, some fifty years ago, they really got their chance. Her collaborators PN Haksar and Nurul Hasan changed the face of India. “Hindu” became a dirty word, and any young historian classified as conscious Hindus could forget an academic career.

This power equation was aggravated by the passivity of the Hindu Nationalists. As the only nationally organized Hindu force, they claim to be the vanguard of Hindu society. If so, they should not be proud of their achievements in this field, where Hinduism has only been losing ground. They have never invested in scholarship. The result can now be seen, when Narendra Modi’s government would like to pack the universities with pro-Hindu or pro-Modi vice-chancellors and other prominent professors, but fail to find qualified people. In 2009 I attended a pro-Hindu conference about the politics of history in Delhi, with the usual wailing about the reigning anti-Hindu bias. But there was no session about Hindus themselves had done wrong in MM Joshi’s textbook reforms of ca. 2002, a horror show of incompetence. To be sure, on the Hindu side there are some valuable individual historians, such as Meenakshi Jain, who has documented the dismal defeat of the “eminent historians” in the Ayodhya debate (Rama and Ayodhya, 2013). But organized Hinduism has produced nothing except some obscurantist repetition of scripture as if it were history.

In recent years, centre-stage has been taken by less ideological historians such as Upinder Singh, daughter of the former Prime Minister. In that sense, her own school of Leftist history-writing has lost some ground, in  the wake of the loss of credibility of Marxism as such. Still, this mainstream secularist school has essentially adopted some key dogmas that the Left in its age of dominance has rendered synonymous with serious scholarship, such as the Aryan invasion and the absence of a “communal” motive in the Muslim conquests. The Hindu perspective is still being ignored or despised.

      
2. SB:      Prof Thapar also criticizes popular history as being outdated or as “not history at all,” and that such history is propagated by “people who are not professional historians.” As someone who has left behind a sizeable body of work critiquing the Thaparesque school of history, how would you define a “professional” historian, and is that tag mandatory for people who actually want to do original, serious scholarly work on their own? This question applies to even those non-tagged people who’ve already done such work. Or is this sort of tagging a tactic to discourage such potential endeavours and to dismiss such work?

For her class of people, a “professional historian” is a historian with academic status. They are very status-conscious and constantly pull rank, especially when faced with informed arguments. For a scholar, this is weak, but for sophomores, it is uppermost in their minds: climbing the status ladder. When you know the academic circles, you become far less inclined to be over-awed by academic status: many professors have obvious ideological prejudices and bend their findings to suit their presuppositions. Moreover, in many countries to some extent, and certainly in India, scholars in the humanities are selected for ideological conformity with the dominant school. After nearly half a century, this has led to a situation where a post of “eminence” is simply equivalent with ideological conformity, at least passively (not raising your head), often actively (furthering the dominant paradigm).

As you know, the late Sita Ram Goel, a qualified historian, was an outsider to academia, working as a publisher and book-seller. Books like his History of Hindu-Christian Encounters are of such calibre, importance of topic, and originality, that he should have been offered a teaching post. But he was a dissident, so Soviet-type historians kept him outside the institutions. An example right now is Shrikant Talageri, whose work is simply revolutionary, creating history where until recently there was only hazy speculation, viz. the Vedic age. Real scholars would not care that he is an outsider, but focus on his methodology and his findings.    

 

3.  SB:     On methodology, Prof Thapar provides a rather detailed explanation about how one should be learned in various disciplines like archeology, linguistics, Sanskrit, Prakrit, geography, genetics, reading inscriptions and so on in order to write on ancient India. Yet, it is a fact that Prof Thapar doesn’t know Sanskrit and she herself admits that “sometimes when reading contemporary archaeological reports I can’t fully understand them because they require training in science.” Yet Prof Thapar is described as a preeminent scholar and historian of ancient India. So, how do you reconcile the two, and two, where does her own admission put her work in light of this?

I have little to add on her personal qualifications. Sanskrit, at least, would really be necessary if you research ancient India. But history is something else than archaeology: historians deal with sources speaking a human language, chiefly writings  and inscriptions, whereas the archaeologists (and likewise, nowadays, the geneticists) try to draw sense from mute objects. I myself have to confess that the technical details of an archaeological report bore me. But their conclusions are of course indispensable for up-to-date historical scholarship. Like Prof. Thapar, I am not equipped to follow the details of the new genetic findings; but of course I have to take their conclusions into account. She does not incriminate herself by admitting that she is ignorant about other fields than history, these human limitations are just normal.

It gets worse, however, when a scholar simply ignores the findings in adjacent fields. This is what you see in the debates on Vedic chronology and the Aryan invasion. Thus, most historians laugh at the ignorant claims of some self-styled “history-rewriters” in the Hindu camp, who put the Mahabharata war in the 4th millennium BCE. These base themselves on scripture, treating it as a literal record, and date events in the light of a Puranic tradition dating the beginning of Kali-Yuga to 3102 BCE. To be sure, the doctrine of four world ages is as old as the epic, and even much older: judging from its presence among the Greeks and Germans, and even as far as the Mayas, it must have existed since distant pre-Vedic days. But the timespans attributed to them are far younger, betraying an estimate of the precession cycle discovered in ca. 150 BCE. These timespans are in thousands of years, not hundreds of thousands of years as in the Puranas. So the Mahabharata war can reasonably be estimated to about 1400 BCE, which is in tune with the genealogical data in the Puranas, their most historically reliable part.

But what is more, and now I come to my point, this scripturalist chronology flies in the face of the findings of several auxiliary sciences. Thus, chariot warfare is central to the Mahabharata’s plot: it cannot be an addition by a later editor. Now, we know through archaeology that war chariots (as distinct from slow carts) originated only in the 3rd millennium, and that the heyday of chariot warfare was the 2nd half of the 2nd millennium, before cavalry warfare took over. The war between the Egyptians and the Hittites, the Biblical pursuit of the Israelites by the Pharaoh, the Trojan war, all took place around 1200 BCE. To say that the Mahabharata battle took place in 3139, as traditionalists do, would imply that chariot technology took all of 1600 years to travel to West Asia. But we know that military technology travels very fast, because generals eager for victory quickly adopt whatever innovation is in sight. Moreover, it implies that the Indians had a more advanced metallurgy (needed to produce chariots, as well as swords and shields) than archaeology can trace for the 32nd century BCE.

Another auxiliary science is archaeo-astronomy. Among the astronomical circumstances described in the epic is the full moon near the star Magha/Regulus after the winter solstice. Now, this star, in its slow precessional movement of 1° per 71 years, has crossed the solstitial axis in ca. 2300. In 3139 BCE, it was some 12° before the solstice, whereas in ca. 1400 BC, it was some 13° past it, as required by the description in the epic. So, the traditionalist chronology ignores the contribution of astronomy.

Prof. Thapar will probably agree with me that traditionalist chronology is bad science because it ignores the findings of these other sciences. However, established chronology including her own school suffers from the same flaw. Thus, we have several astronomical data in Vedic literature that are incompatible with the established chronology. In the Kaushitaki Brahmana, dating from the late Rig-Vedic period, this solstice position of Magha is registered, so that points to ca. 2300. But according to her, this would mean at least 800 years before the Vedic seers started the composition of the Vedic hymns, and at least a thousand years before the Kaushitaki Brahmana was composed. The definitely post-Vedic book Vedanga Jyotisha gives two independent astronomical data that both necessitate its being written in the 14th century BCE, again centuries before its conventional date.

She has tried to explain this away by opining that the authors must have described reminiscences of a earlier positions passed down by their ancestors. But this is impossible: the Vedanga Jyotisha is a hands-on work on observational astronomy, it tells priests where to look in the sky when they want to conduct their rituals. What a strange world it would be, where everybody describes ancestral observations but no one describes what he himself actually sees. So, her escape clause is an explicit admission of what too many historians only do silently: ignore the findings of an important science adjacent and relevant to history-writing. The situation is that a handful of astronomical data consistently support a higher chronology, that not one of them supports the established low chronology, and that nonetheless most scholars in India and abroad proceed as if these data were not a permanent challenge to their conventional chronology.    

     

4.  SB:      While it’s known that even today, Prof Thapar seems unwilling or unable to let go of the now-discredited Aryan Invasion/Migration Theory, what is interesting is that from the beginning of her career as a historian of ancient India, she like many of others of her school, seem to have a penchant for propounding a theory (or at best a hypothesis) based on the absence of evidence. If this sort of thing is done in the sciences, the concerned scholar would not last a second in the academia no matter what his/her standing or experience. Yet she seems to have largely gotten away with it over the course of her long career. In which case, has history and humanities in general become free-for-all?

To be sure, historians have to navigate between many uncertainties and unknowns. Some of these may be resolved through research or by unexpected discoveries, others will be your companion throughout your career. So you ought to exercise some clemency here and accept that the rules of the hard sciences do not always apply to history. Even so, her school could indeed have done better in the Aryan origins debate.

In terms of the evidence now available, you are right to call the Invasion Theory (which some weasels now prefer to call a Migration Theory, though it amounts to the same thing) “discredited”. But in terms of academic opinion, it is not yet discredited at all. I have participated in a number of Indo-Europeanist conferences where the linguists present had often not even heard that there exists an Indian indigenist theory, an “Out-of-India Theory”. And if they had heard of it, they did not bother to study it, because they had also been cautioned that it was supported by evil Hindu nationalists. Note that this is a very unscholarly attitude: a real scholar would realize that someone’s motive for supporting a theory implies nothing whatsoever for the correctness of that theory.

If it did, how could anyone ever support the Aryan Invasion Theory, as she does? That theory is many times more politically connoted than the Indian Homeland theory. It was politically used in many more countries, for a much longer time, and not by some ivory-tower scholars but from positions of power. It was used by British colonialism, by the Nazis, in India by the Nehruvians, the Ambedkarites (in spite of BR Ambedkar’s own opposition to it), the Dravidianists and the Christian missionaries. It is politicized through and through. Yet she, like most academics concerned, supports it. But she is right to ignore these political taints: they are inconsequential for the invasion theory’s correctness. And me too, I treat it as a legitimate competitor in the Homeland debate, though I have finally concluded against it.

 

5. SB:       A related question: given her long expostulations on AIT and Harappa in that interview, it appears that she hasn’t perhaps updated herself with the latest in genetics and archeology, for example, with the kind of dedicated and top-notch work done by say Michel Danino. As someone who continues to closely follow and render your own inputs in this matter, your views, Dr. Elst?

Here we meet the problem once more that we just discussed: scholars willfully ignoring the conclusions from related disciplines. Western linguists who support a more westerly Homeland (hence an Aryan invasion from there into India) ignore the findings of Harappan archaeology. The latter only confirms a complete cultural continuity since before the Harappan cities and lasting through their abandonment. It has failed to find a single trace of Aryans entering India. By contrast, in Central Europe, an invasion from the east ca. 2900 BCE, amply attested both by archaeology and by genetics, has been identified with Indo-Europeanization. That is what an “Aryan invasion” looks like, and it is completely missing in India. Yet, of this state of affairs in Harappan archaeology, Western scholars are completely ignorant; or else they fail to draw conclusions from it for their own field.

Last March I participated in a conference of Indian archaeologists in Delhi. One archaeologist after another testified how his own Harappan excavation site only threw up cultural continuity instead of an Aryan immigrant revolution. Everybody there was skeptical of the invasion theory. I was sitting next to the  nonagenarian éminence grise of Indian archaeology, Prof. BB Lal, who had just publicly said: “Vedic and Harappan are but two sides of the same coin.” At that very time, I received an e-mail from a top American linguist defending a westerly Homeland theory, shared by virtually all his colleagues. I then realized that this was a unique situation: a consensus of top scholars for theory White, and a consensus of scholars in a very related field for theory Black, with neither feeling challenged to respond to the other. Historians ignoring the astro-chronological evidence, linguists ignoring the archaeological evidence: this is abnormal and unhealthy, and the first thing to do now is to break through these walls and get people to listen to the other side.

Actually, this problem of stonewalling is even worse. There are, for instance, philologists who avoid any association with the sterling philological work of Shrikant Talageri. The topic of “history within the Vedas” is quite legitimate, and has been with us for some two centuries. Nobody has revolutionized this field the way Talageri has. Yet many students of ancient history or of Vedic literature are ignorant of his work, often willfully so. Come to mention it: his conclusions are right inside Romila Thapar’s field, so she ought to speak out on it. Fifteen years after the publication of his book The Rigveda, a Historical Analysis, it is about time. (Abroad, top philologists HH Hock and M Witzel, two Germans working in the US, have spoken out, and Talageri has also answered them.) And merely parroting smug denunciations will not do, at least not for a top historian like her.

 

 

6.  SB:     It is also interesting to note in the interview how, after still holding on to said theories about an Aryan Invasion, and falsely extrapolating “some sort of a horse sacrifice” in Central Asia which has a “later reflection in the Vedic corpus” [i.e. Ashwamedha], the interview quickly jumps to how all those who disagree with the AIT are breeding a “chauvinistic attitude,” and how therefore India is not the “greatest of all civilisations,” and further, how accepting ancient India’s greatness would again lead to “the disastrous direction that Aryanism took in Europe in the 20th century” and cautions of how  “Historical theories coupled with extreme nationalism and the politics of identity can have severe consequences…” I don’t see this as anything different from the standard, Marxist-template-ish discourse that we’re all familiar with. So, is this a stubborn insistence on a pet theory that refuses to come to terms with reality or is it something else?

As Talageri has shown, the horse sacrifice originates in the Vedic period and then becomes prominent. Subsequently it was exported to Central Asia. If remains of an Ashwamedha are found there, it is not earlier but later than the Vedic testimonies of this ritual. Its performers are not on the way to, but on the way from India. There is to need at all to deny the Central-Asian findings related to the Veda, only the implied chronology of the Vedas is wrong. Which is no wonder, as the present chronology is not based on anything.

If scholars write, say, “Kena Upanishad (ca. 500 BCE)”, I always wonder: “How do they know that?” For doing proper history, the first thing to straighten out is the chronology of ancient India. In that respect, Romila Thapar has always been a follower, not a leader. Her school has been dominant for half a century, yet no progress at all was made in this respect, they merely parroted the dates that British scholars had thought up.

Perhaps she is too old now to change her mind in view of new evidence, but I don’t think she is attached to a non-Indian Homeland per se. She just hates the Hindu nationalists. Now that these are openly supporting the Indian Homeland hypothesis (which has existed for more than 200 years, since well before the notion of “Hindutva” even existed), she just has to oppose this theory any which way.

As for her allusions to Nazism, that is really rich. Let us be clear that the Nazis completely supported the Aryan Invasion Theory, like she does. Hitler, Thapar, same struggle! This theory was the perfect paradigm of the Nazi worldview: (1) the dynamic White Aryans trekked all the way to India and naturally defeated the indolent Black Aborigines; (2) these race-conscious Aryans imposed the caste system as an Apartheid system to protest their racial purity,-- an example to follow; (3) unfortunately, some race-mixing took place nonetheless, and the Aryan castes, though still superior to the Aborigines, became inferior to their European Aryan cousins; (4) but fortunately, now they were being uplifted again by the rulership of their British cousins, the best thing that ever happened to India.

Though Subhas Bose and many millions of Indians expected Hitler, with all his vegetarianism and swastika, to support them against the British, he actually glorified the British empire and had offered German manpower and expertise to administer it. He thought the leaders of the Freedom Movement should be shot and India put back in its place, for he thought he was having the best interests of the darker races in mind when he tried to keep them in subjugation to a “superior” white nation. Yes, there is plenty of criticism of the Hindutva movement (I myself have written quite a bit of it), but here it is really on the right side. Opposing the Aryan Invasion Theory is not only defensible from a scholarly viewpoint, it also happens to be politically correct.

Most people don’t judge a theory by whether it is true, but by the company it puts them in. If a truth is spoken by a despised group, they will feign to oppose this truth, and even interiorize that position. So, anyone desiring to be in the good books of the international establishment, will oppose an Indian Homeland. Mind you, in this respect (in contrast with the economic realm), the Modi regime is not yet part of the establishment, and it doesn’t invest in a serious (as opposed to a flaky) redrawing of the scholarly power equation. It is still fashionable to laugh at the Indian Homeland position, so if she chooses the safe side, the reason may not be any deeper than this: it need not be true, but it’s cosy. People who are not just camp-followers of the Aryan Invasion Theory, but who can actually defend it with serious arguments, are only a few. She is not one of them.

 

7.  SB:     Equally, when Prof Thapar claims that “Questions that are historically debatable should be treated as such, with scholars holding variant views and each one’s views being weighed in terms of the evidence,” there’s something amiss, eerie even. As you’re aware, there’s a vast body of precisely such variant views, evidence, etc, which I’m sure she’s aware of yet doesn’t deign to even mention. Further, she mentions that this kind of thing “reduces the possibility of a historical debate.” Over the last three decades at least, accomplished scholars like Sita Ram Goel, Ram Swarup, yourself, Vishal Agarwal, Dr. Rajaram, Dr. Meenakshi Jain and others have painstakingly produced volumes aimed at fostering precisely this historical debate. Is this both willful blindness to and denial and/or dismissal of alternate/opposing/different views?  

 
Last summer, two important Indo-Europeanist conferences took place in my neighborhood, in Leiden (Netherlands) and in Marburg (Germany). They commemorated the decipherment of Hittite one hundred years ago. Most linguistic arguments for a westerly Homeland are easy to shoot down. That is why most believers always tell you that the proof exists,-- only it is someone else who has provided it. My own professor of Indo-European linguistics said that linguistics couldn’t really decide it but that it “had been proven” by the archaeologists. Most people there are like Indian civil servants, expert at passing the buck. But at those conferences, there were a few people who said they themselves had the proof for a Pontic Homeland.

It is essentially this: Indo-European and Uralic were originally one family, maybe 10.000 years ago, somewhere in Bactria-Sogdia. This language moved westward to the Ural-Pontic region and was adopted by locals speaking  Northwest-Caucasian, an ergative language (i.e. the object of a verb-with-object, e.g. “he sees her”, is in the same case as the subject of a verb-without-object, e.g. “she goes”) with heavy consonant clusters but few vowels – unlike Uralic but like Sanskrit. This substrate influence of Northwest-Caucasian is sought to explain the Indo-European declension system and other grammatical traits, and its heavy consonant clustering.

Already two remarks: other leading linguists at these conferences were skeptical of this scenario, and the same linguistic traits (ergative structure, consonant clustering) equally count for Tibetan, the immediate neighbor of Manali and Ayodhya, where Aryan history began according to the Puranas. Just to say that this is not gospel truth, just a theory. But this is now the backbone of the belief in a westerly Homeland, and the Indian Homeland school should respond to it.

But then a third remark: this theory was developed in perfect ignorance of Kazanas’s and Talageri’s argumentation for an Indian Homeland. While our side should indeed keep up with developments within the Aryan Invasion school, they should do the same, and so far they haven’t.  Unlike the American Indologists, who are hand in glove with the Indian secularists and openly partisan, these European linguists know little of Indian politics and would be open to pro-Indigenist arguments on merit. They would only demand that these are methodologically sound. Unfortunately, anti-Hindu intellectuals act as gate-keepers and make communication between India and the West difficult for non-established Indian historians. Then again, today there are ways to get around this, and at least my own little person is working to get this debate going. This is my own initiative; the organized Hindu movement is taking an advance on the results, and it will eventually reap the fruits, but it is not doing anything at all to further this research and this debate.  

And this makes me think of one more important aspect of the Aryan debate. A debater confident of his position will seek to debate the strongest version of the opposing position. In that case, the Thapar school would have discussed Talageri’s work threadbare. In reality, they prefer to highlight the Hindutva buffoons who think “history-rewriting” means restating Puranic accounts of history. They seek out the weakest version and then thump their chest at having refuted or ridiculed it. This is seeking cheap success rather than seeking the truth. It is a trick used by the not-so-competent. 

 

8. SB:       A common strand that runs throughout Prof Thapar’s interview is how she alleges that, starting from the Harappan civilization, the “nationalist” and “chauvinist” “version” of Indian history denies diversity, and how this denial is rooted in the “the fear of having to see the past differently, that is, of seeing it as complex interactions of diverse cultures”. This is ridiculous at worst, and ironical to say the least given that right from the Vedic corpus to the massive volumes of dharmashastric texts, local customs, traditions, etc… all of these reflect the contrary: of an all-inclusive umbrella that has incorporated precisely this diversity. For example, it’s well known that Jagannatha in Puri is actually what’s known as a “tribal God.” Thus, contrary to what Prof Thapar claims, if fear was at the root, the “tribal God” of Puri would’ve been destroyed long ago. Exactly how does this pass off as history much less “history reading” and “Scholarship”?

The Thapar school is very status-conscious. When I studied the RSS, I thought it was an RSS trait, that they will hire as a guest speaker an enemy with status rather than a friend without it. But I now realize it is rooted in a pan-Hindu trait shared by Hindu-born secularists. (In fact, it is a universal trait but with important exceptions. In the West, and especially in the US, they appreciate new ideas even if they are brought by someone coming in from the wild. There, the emphasis in on creativity, and it doesn’t matter what status or entitlement/adhikara you have; if it works, it’s alright.) So when they have a difference of opinion with anyone, they will natural take a condescending pose, like alleging that your position is not “scholarly”.

 

9. SB:       Talking about cultural nationalism, Prof Thapar claims that “Traditions, as we know from history, are invented through the generations or on particular occasions.” This is quite a bold claim to make given that I don’t think anyone can the word “invent” with “tradition.”  From my limited studies, traditions just grow organically, in a way, to say, as collective and mutually shared social and religious practices over several generations. My question is twofold: (a) what is the motive behind making such assertions in the context of cultural nationalism? and (b) How does Prof Thapar link this with her other claim that “The construction of cultural nationalism can be rooted in colonial interpretations of a culture, rather than in interpretations that might have existed in pre-colonial times."?

It is simply true that in the colonial period, Indians have acquired a self-perception that didn’t exist  before. Swami Vivekanada and Mahatma Gandhi strongly promoted the idea that India is spiritual while the West is materialistic. But even before Muslim and British colonialism, Hindus had already started reinterpreting their past. Puranic Hindus paid lip-service to the God-given revealed Vedas whereas the Vedic seers themselves knew that the hymns were not revealed by a Supreme Being but skillfully composed by human poets. Ancient Hindus wrote the Vedas, medieval Hindus crawled before the Vedas. Most Hindus believe that the seers Vishvamitra and Vasishtha had a caste-based rivalry, because at a later time caste had become very important, whereas the Rg-Veda doesn’t mention anything about caste. So, the distant past is distorted by the recent past and by the present, and it is part of the historians’ job to reconstruct the events as they looked to their own agents.

A different but related distortion: the recent past obscuring the distant past. I see this in the Aryan debate all the time. So many internet Hindus resolve to disprove the Aryan invasion, and then they start fulminating about Max Müller. I don’t care what Max Müller said or did, he lived in the 19th century whereas we seek to know what happened thousands of years ago. The supposed motives of the coiners and propagators of the theory in the 19th century (colonial, missionary, racist…) cannot possibly say anything whatsoever about the facts of the Indo-European dispersal more than 5000 years ago, or about the presumed Aryan invasion of 3500 years ago. I compare it to being asked to describe a tree in the distance and then proceeding to describe the nearby window through which you look at that tree. If Hindus want to get anywhere with their Aryan debate, the first thing needed is a moratorium on mentioning anything from the colonial period. All the noise about Max Müller only serves the laziness of people who don’t want to acquire the skills to research ancient history.   

 

10.  SB:  It is a given that in a Romila Thapar interview or essay, at least one question or mention will be made about secularism, the tone and tenor of which we are intimately familiar with. So it is with this interview as well. Here, “I would say that secularism in the same sense means putting religion in its place, and maintaining that religion is not to be the single dominant factor in politics and in society and its institutions. The identity of society has to be an open identity.” Forgive my ignorance Dr. Elst, but what exactly does an “open identity” for a society even mean, even in purely lexical terms?

Effectively it means: no identity. It certainly means: no majority, for it could put its stamp on the society as a whole. In some respects, I think she is right about this. For Pakistan, for instance, it would be a healthy innovation.

 

11. SB:   Prof Thapar also claims without proof that “When one gives a definition of a Hindu, it is generally in terms of members of upper castes since the basis of the definition is from the texts of these groups..” To my knowledge, until British started studying Hinduism systematically (for whatever purposes), nobody in India had even attempted to define the term “Hindu.” Indeed, as far as my knowledge goes, there hasn’t been a comprehensive study that shows how Hindus viewed themselves prior to alien Muslim invasions. And so, on what basis does Prof Thapar claim what she does?  

Lack of historical consciousness. The definition of “Hindu” is very simple. Originally a purely geographical Persian term for “India(n)”, the Muslim invaders introduced it with a mixed geographical-religious meaning: “an Indian Pagan”. Christians and Muslims were not included because they were no “idolaters”, and Parsis were not because they were not deemed Indian. But all Indian Pagans, including Brahmins and other castes, Buddhists (“clean-shaven Brahmins”), Jains, tribals, even communities yet to be born, like Lingayats, Sikhs, the Ramakrishna Mission, they were all “Hindu”. In Islamic theology, they were all going to hell anyway. To the Muslims, distinctions of social rank or religious tradition didn’t matter in the least. Their negative definition of “Hindu” was taken over in the definition used in the Hindu Marriage Act, and essentially also in VD Savarkar’s definition of “Hindutva”.

Now, I am not at all impressed when you list that so many millions of Sikhs say: ham Hindu nahin! I am not impressed by all the rhetoric with which the RK Mission is trying to leave the sinking ship of Hinduism. “Hindu” is now a dirty word, the secularists have seen to this, and so everybody is running towards the exit, saying: “We are not Hindu.” Well, this is simply a matter of definition. Tribals who convert to Christianity can legitimately say that they are not Hindus (in spite of the RSS’s weasel position that they are then “Christi Hindus”), but otherwise they are Hindu by definition. Even if millions of people say that “1 + 1 = 4”, I will maintain that it is 2, and I will be proven right in the end.

It is in the Ayodhya debate that I have learned the power of historical scholarship. After the 1989 statement by the JNU historians, starring Romila Thapar, the historical position, though having been a matter of consensus between all the parties involved, was suddenly tabooed. There had already been partial archaeological excavations confirming that there had been a temple on the site where the Babri Masjid was built. Even if you decided to doubt the consensus, the balance of evidence was already clearly on the side of the temple. Yet, the whole mediatic and political class, and all the foreign India-watchers, suddenly had to pretend that the historical position was but a ridiculous Hindutva concoction. Well, through all this commotion, the historical facts remained what they were, and they were amply confirmed by the excavations of 2003. There are still a few Leftists maintaining that there had never been a temple at the site, but most people concerned just look the other way, embarrassed at having been led by the nose so badly. And with such a death toll as a result.

Imagine that this JNU statement had never been made. PM Rajiv Gandhi would have worked out a deal, denounced as “horse-trading” but with the merit of avoiding lots of political commotion and physical violence. He would have bought off the Muslim leadership with some goodies and left the site to the Hindus, thus also boosting his own popularity in the elections. There would not have been an Ayodhya affair, merely the building of just another temple. The BJP was not even on the horizon yet. But no, the “eminent historians” preferred lies and bloodshed (and apparently also the rise of the BJP). It is not often in history that the intervention of intellectuals has had so much effect at the mass level.

But I was saying that Ayodhya has taught me the power of historical scholarship. There was a lot of hue and cry, there was the demonization of the pro-temple position which I also held, in my personal case there was the veto against any academic position for me. But when all was said and done, we were proven right. All the commotion had made no difference to the facts of history. The “eminent historians” were proven wrong.

Why, in fact, has Romila Thapar been interviewed? Though she was already well-known, her hour of glory came with the unnecessary and artificial Ayodhya controversy. But in that controversy, she was on the wrong side. It doesn’t always come about, but in this case it did happen: justice. The wrong side, though absolutely dominant for more than a decade, was proven wrong. Her major claim to fame is now as the historian who was proven wrong, and this in a self-created controversy. I feel for her, she threw away her good reputation at the end of her career. Then again, she can still win it back by crossing the floor in time. She is in an excellent position, for instance, to create the much-needed dialogue between the different schools and disciplines in East and West; to stop the stonewalling, the guilt-by-association and the ridiculing that obstruct or poison the debate.

 

12. SB:   When asked about the reason for the popularity of the Ramayana, Prof Thapar claims that “Evidence of the widespread popularity of the Ramayana is of course more recent….I am referring to when the Ramanandi sect begins to propagate the Ramayana and Rama bhakti…” and the Kamba Ramayana and Krittibaas. To put it bluntly, the good professor is bluffing. As you’re aware, one of the earliest evidences of Ramayana’s popularity can be had in Kalidasa’s Raghuvamsham, and we know his period generally falls in the 5th Century. She also recounts the now-familiar refrain about how Ramayana “celebrates and upholds the patriarchal family order.”  While she’s entitled to her interpretations, the political subtext is unmissable. I’d like you to elaborate more on this, Dr. Elst.

The patriarchal family order is also upheld by the Bible, the Koran etc., yet I can’t remember her protesting against that. Worse is that she judges ancient writings (well, not the Bible or the Koran) by the standards of today, a capital mistake for a historian. The past is the past, every historian ought to know that; only political propagandists blur the distinction between ancient facts and modern standards.

Anyway, the popularity of the Ramayana is not so important, but you are right that it was a thousand years older than she claims. Her position follows from the anti-Hindu fervour of the Ayodhya controversy. Need we say more about it?

 
 

13. SB:   Throughout the interview, there’s plenty of alarmist talk about how we’re now living in an atmosphere where “hegemonic thoughts” and “obscurantism” are growing, and how the good professor has taken “them on as I often have to do.” Equally, there’s also this condescension that stops short of saying that ordinary people must be lectured to about history etc, and that only historians have a special mandate to change the world or whatever. This again is familiar for anyone who has followed the careers of these Eminent Historians. Yet, even as India has mostly moved on from ideology-as-history, this refrain from these Eminent Historians continues to reverberate. What gives?

Well, they are old now, and throughout their career this attitude has served them well. I guess they will not change now. It is again this status consciousness, this pulling rank, this looking steeply down on people without adhikara.

It is a fact, though, that the Modi government and its local dependencies do give the impression of promoting, or at least of giving space to, backward tendencies. There are plenty of Hindus with very backward attitudes and beliefs. That is partly the revenge of a deliberate choice made long ago by Guru Golwalkar. He had a very anti-intellectual prejudice (“do you need to read a book to love your mother?”), which became official policy of the RSS, and as they never listen to feedback, that has remained effective till today. Just watch how Hindutva spokesmen perform in TV debates: their communication skills are dismal, because they have always despised intellectual work, both in scholarship and on the media front.

 

14. SB:   Finally, one must really celebrate the ingenuity of Eminent Historians in coining innovative terminology. Of course, we’re familiar with “otherness,” “upper caste middle class chauvinism,” etc. I came across new ones coined by Prof Thapar here: “Aryanism,”  “Sanitised Aryanism,” and  “Syndicated Hinduism.” Your comments Dr. Elst?

 
In Europe we have a media-conscious philosopher, Bernard-Henri Lévy, who egged the French president on to invade Libya and oust Colonel Qadhafi,-- an unqualified disaster, a very dark cloud without any silver lining. But he is very good at coining catchy phrases. Likewise, I won’t deny that Prof. Thapar has a gift for turning an English phrase and putting her thoughts into sticky new expressions. Good for her.

 

Thank you very much.    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Monday, September 7, 2015

How the West Looks at India: Debating the Hindu Right

(published in The Pioneer, Delhi, 6 September 2015)

 

How does the West look at India? The Western public is completely, and the professional India-watchers largely, dependent on information filtered by a Delhi bottleneck under firm Nehruvian control. This is not a matter of “sepoy” intellectuals blackening India and Hinduism at the behest of an American conspiracy. It is a two-way influence, with Indians trying to live up to Western fashions and Westerners trying to align with Indian ideological norms.


An important new book exemplifies this American-Indian cooperation against any political mobilization in the name of Hinduism: Pluralism and Democracy in India. Debating the Hindu Right (OUP, New York 2015). It is a collection of twenty essays mostly based on updated versions of contributions to a 2005 conference in Chicago. The editors are religious historian Wendy Doniger and law scholar Martha Nussbaum, both from the top-ranking University of Chicago. Doniger’s name has gained some currency in India ever since her book The Hindus, an Alternative History, was withdrawn by the publisher under Hindu pressure. This way, a biased, flippant and error-ridden book, already exposed in detail in Vishal Agarwal’s counter-book, was given a false aura of martyrdom. The episode also confirmed her enmity for any Hindu self-assertion, as is obvious from the introduction she co-authored with Nussbaum.


About the outspokenly partisan perspective of the book, we can be brief because no attempt is made to hide it. Thus, if we are going to discuss "democracy in India", it should be hard to leave the Emergency and the Sangh Parivar's opposition to it unmentioned; yet these are carefully and completely hushed up. The year Zero of the book's time horizon is explicitly said to be 2002, because of the Gujarat riots. On these, the old progressive party-line is still strictly observed, assuming “Modi’s complicity in the riots” (p.14). Herewith, they consciously overrule the fact that “he has not been convicted in court” (p.1), though not for want of trying. But if riots are deemed so important, surely attention is paid to the far larger killing of the Sikhs in 1984 by Congress secularists; or to the East Bengali massacre of Hindus in 1971 that dwarfed all Indian communal killings since Independence combined? No, this book only notices killings when Hindus are (or can be portrayed as) the perpetrators.


The Ayodhya controversy is mentioned a number of times, but without the decisive information, quite new to the American target audience, that the temple claim has meanwhile proved historically correct. The whole lambasting of the centuries-old pro-temple consensus, challenged by the secularists in 1989 and rebaptized the “Hindu fundamentalist claim”, carried along all of American academe, yet it was wrong.  The paper specifically about “the road from Ayodhya” has 40 footnotes, all referring to partisan anti-Hindutva sources except for one in which BJP stalwart Ram Madhav provides some hard data. And that count is representative for most papers, but then Hindus should admit that they themselves have produced few intellectual works worth quoting.


The editors call Naredra Modi’s accession to power “ominous for India’s very future as a democracy” (p.1). In American academe, the demand of objectivity, on which scholarly authority is based, is suspended in works about Hindu politics.


The subtitle could suggest that a debate with the so-called Hindu Right is being envisaged. That is not the case. The debate is in fact between different sections of the secularist Left (with its American extension), as exemplified by Amartya Sen’s response to Ramachandra Guha’s review of his The Argumentative Indian. The Hindu Right is only an object. The token contribution from Ved Nanda as former head of the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (US section of the RSS) has no argumentative thrust, it merely details all the historical and numerical facts about Hinduism in the US.
 

Yet, many of the separate papers in this book are certainly worth reading. Most papers require a review in themselves, but to settle for one example, Mushirul Hasan’s paper on the BJP’s textbook’s reforms provides interesting data on the BJP’s intellectual agenda as seen by the secularists. Once you have accepted that this is not a scholarly account but a veteran’s memoir giving the view of one of the warring camps, it becomes a very worthy read. Incidentally, on p.255, Hasan labels Hindu history-rewriting an “attempt to Talibanise India’s history”, thus holding up an Islamic movement as the level to which Hindus could stoop. Thereby, he implicitly admits that the ideologically streamlined textbooks which he fights in India are a routine fact of life in Pakistan.


A serious drawback of this book is that it narrows its focus to the Sangh Parivar, all while announcing a treatment of the “Hindu Right”. Perhaps this was still passable in 2005, but anyone moderately informed about the ideological scene should know that it is not in 2015. At the mass level, scholars ought to have noticed that the Hindu self-defence network in West Bengal, Hindu Samhati, has been set up by  a dissatisfied ex-Swayamsevak because the RSS was just not living up to its promises. The Sangh’s enemies, such as the editors of this book, portray it as a formidable Hindu force, but insiders know better. It might have number, and today it might even hold office, but its commitment to Hindu victory is wobbly and lackadaisical. More and more, Hindus are locally organizing outside the Sangh. They even continue to do so now that “their” side is in power in Delhi and proving to be no more than time-servers. Mostly they are happy that Modi is at the helm, but for an actual Hindu dimension to politics, more will be needed.


While this trend is still marginal, it is already very visible on the media front, where internet papers have become the arteries of new communities shedding the Sangh baggage and trying to serve the Hindu cause through new analyses: VijayVaani, India Facts, Hindu Human Rights, Swarajya, Bharat-Bharati, the India Inspires Foundation. These people have no power yet, but they do have ideas. More up-to-date and more aware of international trends in political thinking than the gerontocratic Sangh, their thought is far more interesting. It also is more rooted, more Hindu than the Hindutva current, which is stuck in the 1920s’ borrowed nationalist paradigm. If “debate” with the Hindu side is what you want, it is they who are the ones to talk to.

 

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Friday, August 28, 2015

The case of Christopher Wallis, the Tantrik


 

 

In the Indian media, I once saw a beginning politician who had been a bit presumptuous in a speech being denounced as a "pretentious young upstart". I didn't really know how to picture such an entity. At least, not until I read a reaction to my review of Christopher Wallis' book Tantra (see the Hindu Human Rights website: http://www.hinduhumanrights.info/tag/tantra-illuminated-christopher-d-wallis/, or my blog: http://koenraadelst.blogspot.be/2013/06/tantra-for-practitioner.html) by the writer itself.

 

 

Yoga instructor

Even without reading the first word of it, I found this strange. A writer can point out a factual mistake made by a reviewer of his book, say a wrong founding year or  a wrongly attributed membership or status, and even that only if the mistake is truly consequential. But the over-all judgment of the book by the reviewer is just not up for discussion, at least not by the writer. It is bad form to respond to a review. In the dozens of reviews of my books, I have always respected this rule, and so have the dozens of writers whose books I have reviewed. Well, not this fellow. Moreover, he saw the need to fight my opinion a full two years after publication of both the book and the review, long enough after he had had time to calm down even if initially disgruntled.

Moreover, my review was actually a very laudatory one. He ought to consider himself very lucky that his first book was welcomed that heartily. Not every beginning writer is that fortunate. But it seems that this ungrateful fellow could not leave well enough alone. 

He tries to capture the moral high ground by alleging: “Dr. Elst himself has not responded to my points.” On the contrary, my fairly lengthy argumentation pointing out the flaws in his position was precisely the reason for his (belated and inappropriate) response. But it is true that he himself has not responded to my arguments on the main point, viz. about his borrowed anti-Hindu bias, and instead has launched new arguments, to which I respond below.

According to Wallis' Facebook profile, he is an "independent yoga instructor". Not just a yoga practitioner, who gradually discovers all the benefits, such as a greater calm in stressful situations, greater composure, less anger. From a yoga instructor, you might expect this peacefulness in ample measure. It is therefore puzzling to find him gate-crashing to throw around insults and slander, as we shall see. 

 

Gender

The only things that could have irritated him were two criticisms pertaining to only a handful of words in his entire book. The first were some gendered pronouns that followed the imposed feminist neo-convention of treating unisex concepts as feminine: “That human being knows her rights.” This is a very recent Western fad, unknown to every other culture and even to the West for 99% of its history. Just watch the role division in ballroom dancing and see how this feminist intrusion into language is an aberration even from Western sensitivities. More pertinent in the present context is that it also violates the symbolism of Tantra and Kashmiri Shaivism.

Nearly a century ago, the Dutch historian Jan Romein observed that the West had broken away from the “general human pattern”. This is a case in point: every culture has general notions of a gender division of roles and expresses this division through all kinds of symbolism. Grammatical gender may also be an expression of this role division, but otherwise too, gender fills up the symbolic space. Thus, premodern Chinese wouldn’t distinguish between the pronouns “his” and “her”, yet it is Chinese civilization that has given us the division in yin and yang. Kashmiri Shaivism is very emphatic about this role division. The masculine pole, Śiva, represents consciousness; the feminine pole, Śakti, represents energy.

In his response, Wallis claims that ultimately, these spiritual concepts have no gender. This is only an anthropomorphic projection onto the poles of the universe. Entirely true: gendering heaven and earth as father c.q. mother (as in the yin/yang scheme) is only a manner of speaking; but not an arbitrary one. In a very meaningful and conspicuous way, heaven relates to earth as father to mother. In Kashmiri Shaivism too, consciousness is conceived as playing the man’s part, energy the woman’s part. Male and female are not interchangeable, they each have a specific meaning and therefore naturally gravitate to one of these two poles.

It is also this natural difference that conditions languages with gender to treat the feminine as a particular and the masculine (if called upon by the context) as the general gender: “That human being knows his rights”, or even to describe the general condition of both men and women as: “Man is a fallen creature.”  

The Shaiva/Tantric symbolism of man as motionless consciousness and woman as ever-changing energy is like the pattern in ballroom dancing: the male partner has to oversee the room and plan the couple’s moves; the female partner can switch off her thinking and follow the lead he gives, but go through far more turns than he does. Or in the primeval equation of procreating: it is the father who has five minutes of fun to quicken the child, otherwise remaining passive in the whole process (like Shiva prostrate under the dancing goddess’s feet), and the mother who has to expend lots of energy in bearing and later suckling the child. This natural symbolism is applied in Kashmiri Shaivism not just to the cosmos, as in all cultures, but to the yogic process.

According to Wallis, “Tantra invites the deconstruction of your cultural identity, and that is hard for anyone.” The expression “deconstruction of cultural identity” sounds anachronistic in several respects. Nevertheless, Wallis thinks it’s crucial: “But, this philosophy says, only through such deconstruction can you truly realize your deeper identity with timeless spirit, that by definition has no race, caste, religion, nationality, etc” In that case, I invite him to practise what he preaches. Deconstruct your American framework and open up to the very different culture of Kashmiri Shaivism with its symbolism of a clear contrast between the sexes, rather than the current American blur to paper over their universally affirmed difference.

For all their missionary belief in a God-given task of civilizing the savages, modern Americans can do little to improve on the Kashmiri Shaiva symbolism, in use since many centuries and in tune with the gender symbolism of mankind (no, not the neologism humankind) in general. The feminist foray into linguistic usage is not only wrong-headed, it is also in disharmony with Kashmiri Shaivism.

 

“Hindu”

On gender, we may have a difference of opinion, one too unimportant to justify an author’s intervention after a review, but that has not become the cause of any bad blood. By contrast, my scepticism of his solemn assurance that Shaivism has nothing (oh well, “very little”) to do with Hinduism, has really gotten his goat: "Why Dr. Elst and others insist on calling people (like the medieval Shaivas) Hindu that did not think of themselves as Hindu remains a mystery to me, explainable only by a desire to serve a modern agenda of Hindu identity."

Indeed, the Shaiva thinkers were not called Hindu. Neither did they call themselves non-Hindu. Nor was any of their contemporaries called Hindu, nor the Vedic seers, nor the Buddha, nor Shankara: none of them was “Hindu”, and none of them was “non-Hindu”. Before any Shaiva decides to become a fellow-traveller of the Christians and Muslims in the (by definition anti-Hindu) Minorities Commission, let him also consider that no Shaiva pioneer was a Christian or a Muslim.

Why elephants are called elephants though they don’t think of  themselves as “elephants”, that is indeed a mystery. Or, wait, maybe it is not so mysterious after all. Though triangles don’t call themselves triangles, they still deserve to be called triangles in English if they satisfy the definition of “triangle”. So, if you see a big four-footed mammal with a trunk, rather than a slender and hairy two-footed mammal climbing the trees, you are justified it calling it an “elephant” rather than a “monkey”. That is how language users have applied definitions to real-life entities for many thousands of years, everywhere, and to everyone’s satisfaction. I have as yet never heard an elephant protesting. ,

Only now, some people are protesting: “I am not a Hindu!” And yet, the rule is simple: you apply the definition, and those who are in, are Hindus. The Persian word “Hindu” was introduced by the Muslim invaders with the meaning “every Indian Pagan”, i.e. every Indian who doesn’t believe in Mohammed’s unique and definitive prophethood. Or in ”practice”: every Indian who, by Islamic definition, goes to hell. Christians and Jews, already unlikely to be classified as Indians, were at any rate not pure Pagans, for they already had a different slot in Islamic theology. Parsi fire-worshippers were Pagans, alright, but still identifiable as Persians, hence not Indian; so, though it had no soteriological implications, the hell-bound Parsis were not classified as Hindus. But everyone else was: Brahmins and non-Brahmins of every sect, Untouchables, Buddhists (“clean-shaven Brahmins”), Jains, Shaivas of course, Vaishnavas, and even communities that the Muslims had not yet met, like the tribals in the interior, or that didn’t even exist yet: Virashaivas, Sikhs, Arya Samaj, Ramakrishna Mission or the Hare Krishnas.

Some of them don’t like it? Well, I know the solution. Not that I have invented it, for it is age-old and very obvious: grow up. You can’t bend definitions to your likes and dislikes.

This is all the more easy as it has no real consequences. In India you will fall under Hindu Law. Despite its contrary protestations, parroted by most India-watchers, India is a resolutely non-secular state, with separate Civil Codes depending on whether you are a Hindu, Muslim, Christian or Parsi. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, considered the Father of the Constitution, and who staged the first mass “conversion” to Buddhism (old-style “refuge” into the Buddhist order was not a conversion, a concept borrowed from Christianity), already justified the inclusion of Buddhists in the legal Hindu category by observing that the lay followers of the Buddha had never designed a separate law system. Even those who insist on a doctrinal difference, accept that “for all practical purposes”, Indian Buddhists are part of Hindu society. That equally counts for the Jain, Sikh and indeed Shaiva communities.

Nonetheless, protesting that you are “not Hindu” still has advantages. For family law, you will be in the “legal Hindu” category, but for other matters you may be counted as a “minority”,-- a much coveted and privileged status in India. According to the laws and the Constitution, minority schools and temples are autonomous, inviolable, and only partly subject to caste-based reservation arrangements. If recently the Jain community, despite many internal protests, demanded and achieved minority status, it was mainly to safeguard its wealthy schools and temples from usurpation by greedy government officials.

You never hear a Muslim protesting: “I am not a Muslim!” In the Muslim community, on the contrary, some people are denounced as non-Muslims (principally the Ahmadiyas), and the effect is just the opposite: that they gate-crash into the community and insist loudly that somehow they are Muslim after all. And while you may hear a handful of ex-Muslims explain “Why I am not a Muslim” (title of a hefty work by apostate Ibn Warraq), no believing or even merely sociological Muslim will ever claim that he is not a Muslim. Yet it has never occurred to India-watchers that this exclusively Hindu oikophobia (self-hatred), this disowning of only the Hindu identity, is remarkable and significant. It is there for a simple reason: “Hindu” is a swearword. Hindus are not just the target of formal and informal discriminations, but their dharma is systematically blackened.

Some babes in the wood from the West actually think they are being very brave by denouncing Hinduism. In fact, it is what every coward or opportunist in India does. When a man is down, as Hinduism is, every nearby coward is sure to join the local bully in kicking him. When a ship is sinking, as Hinduism is, every rat quits it. Those who are shouting: “We are not Hindus”, are rats.

Finally, let us consider an implication of Wallis’s “Shaiva, not Hindu” stand which he may not have foreseen. During the Ayodhya controversy, secularist historians tried to find instances where Hindus had done to others what Muslims have assuredly done to them. What little they came up with, pertained to Shaivas, particularly Shashank of Bengal, Jnana Sambandar of the South, and Harsha of Kashmir. Indeed, for a scriptural injunction to burn books offensive to one’s own beliefs, you have to go to the Lingayat Shaivas. Is Wallis prepared to go and tell the secularists (not the Hindus, who are an easy prey, but the still-dominant secularists): “No, leave the Hindus alone! The culprits were not Hindus, it was us Shaivas.”

That move wouldn’t prove or disprove the Hindu character of Shaivism. But it would show Wallis to have the courage of his conviction. Instead of pouring his scorn on an objective reviewer, he should save it for the secularists. All while being anti-Hindu, they uphold the “myth” that Shaivas are Hindus, the object of Wallis’s ire.

 

Anti-Hindu bias

In modern India scholarship, or rather “South Asia Studies”, this anti-Hindu bias is supported, either by hiding it and denying that it even exists (“India’s secularism is threatened by Hindu majoritarianism!”) or, more rarely, by openly acknowledging and defending it. Thus, in her keynote address at the 2014 conference of the European Association of South-Asian Studies in Zurich, Delhi Law Professor openly admitted and speciously justified the anti-Hindu discriminations, to general acclaim. These academics, whose authority is based on the public’s assumption that academia equals objectivity, are in great majority partisan on the anti-Hindu side, passively or actively.

By contrast, in classical Indian scholarship, among Sanskritists like Wallis, you often find ivory-tower scholars who are hardly aware of this modern bias. They usually don’t even realize that they too have interiorized some of its assumptions, particularly anti-Brahmanism, the Indian equivalent of anti-Semitism. In their publications about Indian Buddhism, for instance, the vast majority follows the established “Hinduism bad, Buddhism good” framework. If Wallis claims that Kashmiri Shaivism was more influenced by Buddhism than by Vaishavism (presumably Hindu), it can safely be taken as an application of the same bias..

Of the many “Hindu” things in both Shaivism and Vaishnavism, but not in Buddhism, we may mention theism as the prime example. That “all is suffering” is foundational in Buddhism, not in the Vedas nor in Kashmiri Shaivism. Like the latter, the Taittiriya Upanishad says that Brahman is joy, the opposite of “all is suffering”. In this respect, joyful Kashmiri Shaivism certainly was in harmony with the proverbially positive valuation of the world in the Vedas, more than with Buddhism.

Some of them also project modern egalitarian anti-caste concerns onto ancient writers who took inequality for granted. This is also what an off-hand claim by Wallis suggests, viz. that Shaivism originated in a reaction against “Vedic” casteism. The main Kashmiri Shaiva (like the main Buddhist) thinkers were Brahmins, in the modern period not an objection against espousing the anti-Brahmin ideology, but in those days very unlikely. They also, like the Mahayana Buddhists, chose to write in Sanskrit, rightly called in Chinese fanyu, i.e. “Brahmin language”. This kept them part of the ongoing dialogue between all literate schools of Hinduism, and none of these considered them beyond the pale of Arya Dharma.

Were they Vedabahya, “outside the Vedas”, as Wallis alleges? So was Patañjali, so was Sankhya, scolded by Shankara for never quoting the Vedas. And to the historical definition of Hinduism, this consideration is irrelevant anyway. The Muslims didn’t ask for religious doctrines, they didn’t care one bit whether people believed in the Vedas, the Shiva Sutras or other books: they were all hell-bound Hindus anyway.

At any rate, while Sanskritists usually convey some of the anti-Hindu bias of their contacts in the Indian establishment, they may be quite innocent. That is why in my review, I gave Wallis the benefit of the doubt. I discerned the predictable “hatred of Hinduism” in his text, but whether he had interiorized it or it was only an effect of the Zeitgeist, I left undecided. It is only in his unsolicited response two years later that Wallis leaves little doubt about actively sharing the anti-Hindu prejudice.

Ah, he says, but I do not hate Hindus. In his characteristically self-important way: “The claim that I hate any aspect of Hinduism is completely absurd and could only be made by someone who hasn't met me. I invite you to reserve your judgment until then." There is no reason to meet him, he is not the centre of the world. But he has expressed himself in his book, and in some sentences it conveys the dominant hatred of Hinduism. He himself may be naïve enough not to notice this, but it is there for outsiders to see.

Of course he doesn’t have to hate Hindus: many Hindu-bashers hate Hinduism, not Hindus. The Christian missionaries (claim to, and often really believe to) love Hindus, so they badly want to free them from the shackles of their false religion. Indianists, you do not have to hate Hindus, just hating Hinduism is enough. And you don’t even have to utter this hate: most Hinduism-haters have perfected the art of claiming to love what they seek to destroy.

Let me conclude with what I wrote during the debate on the HHH website: “Another misreading is that I attributed to you ‘hatred of Hinduism’. To your book, yes; but my point was precisely that this hatred has become part of the India-watching framework. Scholars not very specifically aware of this are bound to lap it up rather innocently. Among scholars of classical India especially, poring over texts in their ivory towers, it is common to reproduce anti-Hindu assumptions like babes in the wood, without being aware of the wilful bias behind the assumptions they make. See e.g. how most texts on Indian Buddhism vehiculate the ‘Hinduism bad, Buddhism good’ assumption, whereas the scholars concerned honestly think they are being impartisan. So, I allowed you the benefit of the doubt. But I am afraid that after your writings of the last few days, your protestations that you ‘do not hate Hinduism’ will fall on deaf (or rather, skeptical) ears among most born Hindus here.”

 

 

Why “Shaivism is not Hindu”

In my review, I gave a number of examples of the total continuity of Kashmiri Shaivism with earlier “Hindu” traditions, chiefly the Vedic-Upanishadic and Yogic traditions. Wallis has not tried to refute even one of them. Of course not: on that score, my position is quite mainstream, at least among scholars. Among outsiders, the old story is still parroted that Vedic ritual and the Sanskrit language are foreign impositions, patriarchal and evil, hiding behind the fortification of the imposed caste Apartheid, while Tantra is the native, matriarchal, good tradition. But a leading scholar of Tantra, David Gordon White, though a believer in the Aryan Invasion and lambasted by many Hindus as an enemy, rejects this dichotomy and largely deduces Tantra from the Vedas.

So Wallis tries some other elements, claiming that they contrast with their “Hindu” counterparts. Thus, he claims that Kashmiri Shaivism does not believe in karma, at least not after initiation, when karma is washed away. If so, that would be another sure jump into the Hindu fold. First of all, by this account it does believe in karma and, like other Hindu schools including Buddhism and Jainism, it believes in an antagonism between karma and the spiritual path, meaning that you shed karma as you progress. Only, in this case it is not conceived as happening gradually, but in a jump, upon initiation by the Guru. Well, that is in common with other sects of Hinduism.

Originally, and still in Jainism, karma was understood as a scientific law: you are alone with your karma and you have to discharge it in full. No shortcuts. I am not sure I believe in karma, but if there is such a thing, I would expect it to work like that. It is non-negotiable, and no deity or guru can discharge it instead of you. But later, in the Puranas, in devotional Buddhism and in the manuals about the specific lore of pilgrimage sites, you find plenty of ways to overcome karma quickly: this ritual at that temple, or this donation to that guru, or this mantra rather than that, taking the name of this bodhisattva or that god, will quickly remove that much karma from your burden. It is like the indulgences in the Catholic Church: buy that many of them, and that many years of purgatory are lifted. I am not surprised that in Wallis’ account, we get a similar story in Kashmiri Shaivism. I remain sceptical, though, of his assertion that karma is non-existent after initiation. That would put these initiates beyond the reach of the usual misfortunes of life.

Another issue is caste. Since it is so profitable materially, socially and in terms of approval rate among the chatterati, most cowards (we shall see later why I use the word here) and opportunists take the easy way out of the Hindu state of being discriminated against and depreciated. They declare themselves un-Hindu and candidate for the benefits and privileges of minority status. The very first argument they invariably come up with, is caste: “Hindus practise caste while our founder was against caste.” This is usually nonsense, both as a historical claim about the founder’s message and as a description of the community’s actual social life. Thus, the Sikh Gurus all belonged to the Khattri caste and took care to select their successors from it. Sikh Jats traditionally marry non-Sikh Jats but not Sikh Aroras. Jain Agarwals marry non-Jain Agarwals but not Jain Oswals. The founders were not social reformers, which would have been an even bigger task than pursuing one’s self-interest, even less compatible with the spiritual goal. And yet, Wallis claims that Kashmiri Shaivism came about as a reaction against “Vedic” casteism.

Hindu-bashers have a way of manipulating the term’s meaning. When Hinduism has to be belittled, numerous communities are paraded as “other religions”, to which Hindus can “convert” because they are “not Hindu”. By that standard, “Hindus” are a small minority, essentially only the orthodox Brahmins. But when Hindus complain that they are discriminated against, up comes hollow secularist laughter: “But how can you be discriminated against?! You are more than 80%!” Tribals are emphatically called “not Hindu” in Christian and “South-Asianist” publications, but when they misbehave and kill Christians or Muslims, they suddenly get transformed into “Hindu rioters”. So, picking and choosing which manipulated meaning best serves their case is common among Hindu-bashers. And in keeping with this pattern, Wallis utters his doubt about equating “Hindu” with “Vedic” yet writes twice that sects (Buddhism and Shaivism) are not Hindu because Vedabahya, “outside the Veda”. So the Rishis were not Hindu: as composers of the Vedic hymns, they obviously didn’t have the later Hindu preoccupation of divinizing and absolutizing the Vedas. They were Vedabahya, yet by all accounts they fulfilled the definition of “Hindu”.

Finally, a further smattering of continuities between “Hinduism” and Kashmiri Shaivism. Goddess worship is common to the tribals, village Hinduism, and Vedism, and was central to the practice of the Hindu philosopher par excellence, Shankaracharya. Vedic stormgod Rudra (first word of the foundational text of Kashmiri Shaivism, the Shiva Sutra), who later received the apotropaeic nickname Shiva, has a lot in common with Vedic storm-god Indra (the first signifying the unexpected and dangerous Himalayan thunderstorms, the latter the predictable and welcome thunderstorm opening the monsoon rains). Thus, Shiva forms a pair with Shakti, and Indra forms a pair with Shachi, from the same root and with the same meaning as Shakti.

The evolution from Samkhya’s 25 substances to Kashmiri Shaivism’s 36 parallels the evolution from Shankara’s monism to the theistic later forms of Vedanta, viz. from individual to universal: breaking through the “veils” from Purusha to Shiva, c.q. admitting that the Brahman is still bigger than the Atman (like the ocean is the same as a drop, yet bigger). Most importantly of all, the striving for a kind of liberation or enlightenment is common to many Hindu sects including Buddhism. Kashmiri Shaivism did not invent it and could not have borrowed it from Christianity or Islam, it just kept it from its “Hindu” forebears. 

Finally we must consider Wallis’ statement: "I would also say Hinduism as I experience it in India today is very dissimilar to classical Shaivism." So is what the Vedic Rishis did. And so are some parts of modern Hinduism vis-à-vis other parts. Hinduism is a commonwealth of very different Sampradayas, who have at least this in common that, according to Christianity and Islam, they are going to eternal damnation. If Wallis stays on the Kashmiri Shaiva path, he will meet Kshemaraja, Abhinavagupta, Lakshman Joo and all the others in hell, along with Shankara, Sayana, Basava, Nanak, the Buddha and the rest of the accursed Hindus.

Christian missionaries as the most strategically savvy part of the secularist coalition just love the fragmentation of Hinduism. Instead of a potentially solid enemy, they would find a string of separate sects ready to be swallowed each on its own terms. Most Indology Departments share this strategic vision, though they are less explicit about it.

 

My career 

In the polemic in the HHH’s reader’s column, I wondered aloud if Wallis really means what he says. If he cares about his academic career, he would take the Hindu-denying position anyway, as it is the approved position of the establishment. “Finally: I don't know if CW even means what he writes here, because he has to write it. If he wrote the truth, it would be denounced as ‘Hindutva’ and he could forget his academic career.”

That is still entirely true. Name me a single established professor who made his career all while being known as a Hindutva supporter. I, by contrast, can easily enumerate a lot of professors who have been known all along as Communist or as generally anti-Hindu and certainly anti-Hindutva, without this standing in the way of their promotions. But Wallis is not interested in the truth of this observation, and turns it into a slanderous allegation against me:

"In his last comment the sour grapes that motivate his bilious vitriol become apparent -- sticking to his fundamentalism has vetoed his academic career, so he supposes I must be toeing the party line to get or keep a job, since obviously the truth is along the lines of what gets labeled 'hindutva'!"


Note that the subject of the veto against me, or even the veto itself, had not been mentioned by me. It is entirely Wallis who has introduced it into the debate, clutching at this straw of an ad hominem argument. He would like to impute his own conformism with the dominant school of thought to a jaundiced perception caused by sour grapes. Note again that I have given no occasion for this, it is entirely in the eye of the beholder.

So, observing a verifiable state of affairs spanning the whole India-watching sector (already discussed by Ram Swarup for Sikhism and the Ramakrishna Mission more than twenty years ago) is neither true nor untrue, but is “bilious vitriol”. After this mind-revealing scatologism, he accuses me of “fundamentalism” and assumes that this fundamentalism is what has “vetoed my academic career”. He also imputes to me “the truth is along the lines of what gets labeled 'hindutva'".

I have written thousands of pages on that very subject, on that which outsiders call “Hindu fundamentalism”, and I have several times promised a symbolic euro if anyone could substantiate the common accusation that I, not even a Hindu, am a Hindu “fundamentalist”. That euro is still with me, so I can award it to Wallis if he finally does the job. Among civilized people, allegations come with evidence instead of with “bile” and “vitriol”. He may also try to explain away my own publications thematising specific criticisms of Hindutva. The difference with the secularist and especially the Western theses about Hindutva is that my critique is based on primary knowledge, not on hearsay from partisan sources.

“To toe a party line” is usually said of people who hide their real convictions to parrot an officially sanctioned doctrine. In Wallis’s case, there is no longer any reason to assume that he has to conceal his own belief in order to toe the party-line. From his writing, it appears that he genuinely believes the party-line, which he has interiorized.

The true account of this veto against any academic career for me had nothing to do with any “fundamentalism”, though lazy minds (whom you find in plenty in academe and the media) may have described my position as “fundamentalism” because alleged fundamentalists held the same position. Instead, it had to do with the Ayodhya controversy. In 1990, the presentation of my book Ram Janmabhoomi vs. Babri Masjid, a Case Study in Hindu-Muslim Conflict by BJP leader LK Advani made headlines in all Indian newspapers. For over a year already, the secularist alliance had denied the historical evidence on Ayodhya and broken the long-standing consensus view, shared by all parties concerned including the Indian Muslims, that the Rama temple there had been forcibly destroyed to make way for the Babri Masjid.

Their supporters in the West reproduced and propagated the sudden new orthodoxy that there had never been a temple there. Even Western professors who themselves had added evidence to the demolished-temple thesis, now were bullied into swallowing their words. The situation in Western universities was that either you looked the other way, or you came out in support of the destroyed-temple thesis and the Babri mosque. Their second-hand testimony was then used to over-awe the Indian public and create the impression that the no-temple thesis was scientific while the original demolished-temple thesis was superstitious. But then, here comes a Westerner to break ranks and join the pro-temple camp. Logically, I became persona no grata in all Indian secularist and Western India-watching circles.

The crucial fact here is that the academics’ position proved to be wrong, while my position was simply the scholarly position and proved to be right. If there could still be any debate about this in the 1990s (debate which was not really allowed, because overruled by an emphatically imposed new orthodoxy), there is no debate now, after the Court-ordered excavations of 2003 and the Court verdict of 2010. So, I was vetoed for being right, at the most for being dissident, not at all for being substandard nor for being “fundamentalist”. At the annual conference of the American Academy of Religion shortly after the verdict, I was actually congratulated for ultimately being proven right by a few American professors. That was nice, but it could not undo the injustice done. .

 

Insults

Early on in his letter-writing campaign, Wallis briefly put on his spiritual persona: “I'm very sorry that you are/seem so twisted up, desiccated, and empty of joy inside, KE. I grieve your embittered and closed mind. I grieve your total inability to hear what I'm really saying.”

This is the kind of faux-compassion I can do without. I am certainly not twisted up nor empty of joy inside, thank you. As for “desiccated”, I simply don’t know what that would refer to. But I do notice that someone who knows nothing about me except for my scholarly comment on his own work, gladly embarks upon an unsolicited psycho-analysis. And this is again entirely part of the Zeitgeist in his circles. He may find himself so very special, but in fact he is a very banal and predictable follower of the Wendy Donigers, Paul Courtrights and Jeffrey Kripals of this world. None of them would be taken seriously by genuine psycho-analysts, but regarding Hinduism and anyone who stands up for it, they feel entitled to try a little soul-gazing.

It is also remarkable that, while having so little to build conclusions on, he effortlessly throws the denunciations around: “embittered”, “closed mind”. In two other places he accuses me of “madness” and of “insanity”, no less.

And so, amid all those deliberate insults, he challenges me: “KE, instead of taking my words as insults, why not reflect on why they might describe my experience of you?"

I hadn’t bothered to take them as insults so far. Rather, I mused: “Where are those big words taking this little fellow?” But come to think of it, they are clearly meant as insults. To be sure, I have some experience with trolls and I know the type: first a hit-and-run attack, then trying to prevent the normal reaction by suddenly becoming preachy. That exactly is what Wallis does: first throwing the insults around and then hoping to avoid reactions by putting up his spiritual persona.

As for his experience of me: he doesn’t like being berated for a position stemming from a widespread hate, nor being caught in the act of reproducing this hate without realizing it. I have pointed out his indebtedness to an official doctrine interiorized by him without understanding its highly partisan nature. It is not pleasant being found out to have been duped, but then, at his age, learning from one’s mistakes should be an everyday experience.

 

An irascible yoga instructor

On 10 August 2015, Christopher Wallis wrote to me in person on the Facebook message service: "I am interested to see, if we ever meet in person, if you are the coward I think you are, or if you would ever dare to speak that way to my face. But mostly I feel sad for you. You have so obviously chosen the path of being right over that of being happy."

I was entirely happy with my review, and he had reason to be 99% happy for my praise and 1% happy for the critical feedback that allowed him to become an even better scholar. But instead, he chose to be unhappy and to make a belated attempt to prove himself right. He himself has “so obviously chosen the path of being right over that of being happy" – and even in that “being right” he hasn’t succeeded.

As for “cowardice”, I never think of scholarly work and debate in terms of bravery. God forbid that a fellow scholar would one day be someone to be afraid of, and against whom you would need to muster all your courage. (That is why I have mixed feelings about NS Rajaram’s and Rajiv Malhotra’s term “intellectual Kshatriya”, as kshatriyahood requires bravery.) Compared to frontline soldiers or mountaineers, scholars have an easy life, so it is inappropriate for them to think of their own work in terms of cowardice and bravery. I have known some fellow scholars wimp out when they heard I would be on the panel, but unnecessarily so: depending on the context, I tend to tone down my message if too much of it would embarrass a colleague. But of course, if Wallis hopes to make me say that Shaivism is un-Hindu after all, he is living in a fool’s paradise.

Earlier, he had challenged me to a public debate: "I would happily debate you in person, KE, and let the audience decide for themselves who is ignorant and who is cherry-picking evidence to support a foregone conclusion."

Perhaps a coward would have wimped out, a position easy to confuse with the possible answer of a person too proud to lower himself to this level. Anyway, none of this applies, for I had accepted: “Be my guest, Christopher. However, I would prefer to debate this with the ones whose framework you (and perhaps your Indian Shaiva informers) have naively borrowed and interiorized, and for whom you are only a useful idiot.”

 

Conclusion

At any rate, someone so irascible is clearly not mature enough to act as a yoga instructor. In traditional societies, such as the one in which the Kashmiri Shaiva thinkers lived, older men sometimes have the duty to rein in fiery young men, “pretentious young upstarts”. That is the duty I have discharged here.

Wallis may of course learn and become a real yogi after all. But as of now, he is just not credible as a “yoga instructor”.

 

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